Joan F. Stephens v. Brent Henderson : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Joan F. Stephens v. Brent Henderson : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gregory J. Sanders, Carman E. Kipp; Kipp and Christian, P.C.; Attorneys for Appellant.
James G. Clark; Ray Harding Ivie, Ray Phillips Ivie; Ivie and Young; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Stephens v. Henderson, No. 860440.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1287
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
45.9 
DOCKET NO. i & Q f £ ^ L _ _ 
JOAN F. STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff - Respondent, 
vs. 
BRENT HENDERSON, d/b/a 
CLASSIC SKATING CENTER, 
Defendant - Appellant, 
and 
JOHN DOE, 
Defendant. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Docket No. 86-0440 
Category No. 13b 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment Upon Jury Verdict of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County 
State of Utah 
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge 
JAMES G. CLARK 
4 2 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 375-6092 
RAY HARDING IVIE 
RAY PHILLIPS IVIE 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
GREGORY J. SANDERS 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
600 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
FILED 
FEB 111987 
Ciflrtt, Supitm Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN F. STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff - Respondent, 
vs. 
BRENT HENDERSON, d/b/a 
CLASSIC SKATING CENTER, 
Defendant - Appellant, 
and 
JOHN DOE, 
Defendant. 
Docket No. 86-0440 
Category No. 1 3b 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment Upon Jury Verdict of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County 
State of Utah 
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge 
JAMES G. CLARK 
4 2 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 375-6092 
RAY HARDING IVIE 
RAY PHILLIPS IVIE 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
GREGORY J. SANDERS 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
600 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPEAL IS PEOPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
II. THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT'S PROVISION 
ELIMINATING JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO THIS CASE 
BECAUSE IT AFFECTS NO SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT 
WHICH HAS VESTED 
III. IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO APPLY LEGISLA-
TIVE INTENT TO RESOLVE THIS APPEAL .... 
IV. THE ACTIONS OF JOHN DOE CONSTITUTE AN 
INTENTIONAL TORT FOR WHICH AN INSTRUC-
TION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN 
CONCLUSION 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED PAGE 
Hall v. ANR Freight System, Inc., 717 P.2d 434 
(Ariz. 1986) 3, 4, 6 
Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980) 13 
Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n. , 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 P.2d 689 (1954) 7 
Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344 
(Utah 1984) 10 
STATUTE CITED 
U.C.A., § 78-16-1 (1953 as amended) 12 
-ii-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues herein that the counterclaim which was 
originally asserted was abandoned by merger into the pre-trial 
order. The appeal is, consequently, properly before the Court. 
The arguments advanced by plaintiff which claim the 
Liability Reform Act does not apply to this case have been con-
sidered and rejected by another court because they fail to fully 
address the vesting of substantive rights. 
Legislative intent is not helpful under the circum-
stances of this appeal because plaintiff attempts to substitute 
intent for established rules of law. 
Finally, the acts of John Doe were intentional as shown 
by the evidence or at least the jury should have received the 
opportunity to apply the standard of care for intentional torts 
by receiving the rejected instruction number 27. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE APPEAL IS PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE COURT 
Plaintiff argues in her brief that a counterclaim 
orginally filed with the answer to the complaint, but not con-
sidered at trial, renders the judgment not ripe for appeal. 
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However, page 5 of the Respondents Brief indicates that no 
objection is made to this appeal being heard by the Court and a 
review of the record shows that the counterclaim was abandoned 
prior to trial. 
There is no specific reference in the record to a 
formal disposition of the counterclaim. However, an examination 
of the complete record will show that the counterclaim was not 
asserted at trial and was abandoned. While it would have been 
better form to have had a formal record of the dismissal of the 
counterclaim, the very nature of the*claim, as pointed out by the 
plaintiff, is such that jury verdict implies that the counter-
claim would not have been successful. The point raised is, 
therefore, moot. 
Finally, the pre-trial order of the court, at R., p. 
205, reduces the claims of the parties to their final form. As 
the pre-trial order shows, the counterclaim was not reserved at 
the time the pre-trial order was entered and was eliminated by 
merger of the pleadings into the order. 
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II. 
THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT'S PROVISION 
ELIMINATING JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO THIS CASE 
BECAUSE IT AFFECTS NO SUBSTANTIVE 
RIGHT WHICH HAS VESTED 
In her brief, plaintiff argues that the provisions of 
the Liability Reform Act eliminating joint and several liability 
should not be applied to this case. (Brief of Respondent, Point 
II). In both defendant's principal brief and plaintiff's respon-
sive brief, there is substantial discussion regarding retroactive 
versus prospective application and substantive versus procedural 
rights. A close examination of the recent Arizona Supreme Court 
Case of Hall v. ANR Freight System, Inc., 717 P.2d 434 (Ariz. 
1986) will serve to focus more clearly the argument made by 
defendant in his brief and to show the fallacy of the arguments 
presented in plaintiff's brief. 
In Hall, the Arizona Supreme Court considered whether 
Arizona's Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act was con-
stitutional when, by its terms, it applied retroactively to 
accidents occurring before the effective date of the statute. 
While the Hall case deals specifically with contributory negli-
gence rather than joint and several liability, the analysis used 
by the Arizona Supreme Court is entirely applicable to this case. 
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In the present case, plaintiff's argument is basically 
that (1) substantive legal rights may not be retroactively im-
paired, (2) joint and several liability is a substantive right, 
and, therefore, (3) joint and several liability may not be retro-
actively impaired. A similar argument concerning contributory 
negligence was involved in the Hall case. In that case, the 
Arizona Supreme Court stated as follows: 
"The defendant's argument may appropri-
ately be cast as a syllogism. Simply 
put, defendant argues that: (1) substan-
tive legal rights may not be retroactive-
ly impaired, (2) contributory negligence 
is a substantive legal right, thus (3) 
contributory negligence may not be retro-
actively impaired. From this conclusion, 
the defendant explains, it is but a short 
step to the judgment that the Act, by 
encompassing past events, retroactively 
divests the defendant of common law 
contributory negligence as a bar to 
recovery and is therefore constitution-
ally infirmed. While we have no quarrel 
with the merits of deductive reasoning, 
we must eschew the tempting simplicity of 
defendant's analysis, which, though a 
correct statement of the law, belies an 
underlying morass of semantic confu-
sion." Id. at p. 442. 
The Court then agreed with defendant's premise that 
contributory negligence is a substantive legal right but contin-
ued as follows: 
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"However, the determination that contrib-
utory negligence is a substantive legal 
right merely begins, rather than con-
cludes, our discussion. 'Substantive' is 
merely a label we apply to certain legal 
rights. The conclusion that a particular 
legal right is substantive, in contrast 
to procedural, does not mean that it can 
never be modified or abolished by the 
legislature. 'The rule is that any right 
conferred by statute may be taken away by 
statute before it has become vested.' 
The rule is the same for the common 
law." Id. at p. 442. (Citations omit-
ted) . 
The Court, therefore, was ". . . squarely faced with 
deciding what is meant by 'retroactive' in the shibboleth 'sub-
stantive rights may not be retroactively impaired.'1' Id. at p. 
443. In addressing that question, the Court stated as follows: 
"When the defendant asserts that substan-
tive legal rights cannot be retroactively 
impaired, he cannot mean that substantive 
rights may never be altered. Such a 
contention would sweep far too broadly, 
since substantive rights, whether statu-
tory or common law, may be abrogated 
before vesting. . . . 
Nor can the defendant be heard to say 
that the prohibition against retroactive 
legislation means that statutes cannot 
affect past events. In Arizona it is 
conclusively settled that laws are not 
retroactive simply because they relate to 
past events. . . . 
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. . . Clearly, the mere fact that the Act 
applies to prior accidents does not make 
the Act retroactive in effect. Nor does 
the fact that the Act affects a substan-
tive legal right render it retroactive. 
The critical inquiry in retroactivity 
analysis is not whether a statute affects 
a substantive right but whether a statute 
affects a vested right. Thus the implic-
it meaning of the statement 'substantive 
rights may not be retroactively impaired' 
is 'substantive rights may not be impair-
ed once vested. '" Id. at pp. 443, 444 
(Emphasis in original). 
The focus of inquiry, therefore, is not so much on 
whether the right is substantive as on whether the right has 
vested. Accepting as correct plaintiff's argument that the right 
to joint and several liability is a substantive right does not 
end the inquiry. A determination must still be made as to when 
the right actually vests. In that regard, the Arizona Supreme 
Court in the Hall case stated as follows: 
"Rights are vested, in contradistinction 
of being expectant or contingent. They 
are vested, when the right to enjoyment, 
present or prospective, has become the 
property of some particular person or 
persons as a present interest. They are 
expectant when they depend upon the 
continued existence of the present condi-
tion of things until the happening of 
some future event. They are contingent 
when they are only to come into existence 
on an event or condition which may not 
happen or be performed until such other 
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event may prevent their vesting." Id. at 
p. 444. (Quoting Steinfeld v. Neilsen, 
139 P. 870f 896 (1913)). 
See also, Silver King Coalition Mines Company v. Industrial 
Commission, 2 Utah 2d 1, 286 P.2d 689 (1954) where the court 
stated "that a right is not 'vested1 unless it is something more 
than such a mere expectation as may be based upon an anticipated 
continuation of the present laws." Id. at p. 692. 
Applying the foregoing principles to the doctrine of 
joint and several liability involved in this case leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that the right to joint and several lia-
bility does not vest until judgment is obtained. This principle 
can be demonstrated by examining the various points of time at. 
which it might be argued that the right vests. 
The first such point of time is that which plaintiff 
asks this court to accept, namely, the time the underlying cause 
of action accrues. This argument suggests that a plaintiff 
injured by multiple tort-feasors has somehow acquired a present 
interest above and beyond those rights acquired by a plaintiff 
injured by a single tort-feasor. What that present interest 
consists of under plaintiff's argument is impossible to define. 
A plaintiff injured by multiple tort-feasors acquires no addi-
tional cause of action by virtue of the doctrine of joint and 
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several liability. He or she may not employ any different pro-
cedure during the prosecution of such an action other than that 
which could be employed in an action against a single tort-
feasor. The most that can be said is that the plaintiff may 
expect at some future point to enforce a judgment entirely 
against one of those multiple tort-feasors. But that expectation 
is dependent upon some future event, namely, entry of a judgment. 
That event may never happen. Such an expectation of a future 
happening is not a present interest which would cause plaintiff's 
right in joint and several liability to vest. 
The next point of time at which it might be argued that 
the right to joint and several liability vests is at the time the 
action is commenced. However, the argument that the right to 
joint and several liability vests at that time suffers from the 
same infirmities as the argument just discussed. 
The only reasonable conclusion as to when the right to 
joint and several liability vests is that it vests at the time 
judgment is entered. At that time, and only at that time, a 
plaintiff acquires a present interest or a right which that 
plaintiff did not previously have. It is only after judgment has 
been entered that plaintiff may take some affirmative action by 
virtue of the doctrine of joint and several liability. The 
doctrine allows the plaintiff to enforce or collect the judgment 
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entirely from any one of multiple judgment debtors. Before 
judgment is entered, plaintiff has nothing more than an expecta-
tion that once judgment is entered, plaintiff may collect 100% of 
the judgment from any of the multiple tort-feasors. The only 
reasonable and logical conclusion is that the right to joint and 
several liability vests at the time judgment is entered. Accord-
ingly, if judgment had not been entered prior to the effective 
date of the Act, the plaintiff fs right to joint and several 
liability was extinguished. 
This conclusion has the added benefit of resolving what 
otherwise would be a conflict between the Liability Reform Act's 
provision eliminating joint and several liability and that abol-
ishing contribution. Under plaintiff's argument, joint and 
several liability is abolished only in those cases where the 
underlying cause of action arose after the effective date of the 
Act. If a plaintiff's cause of action arose before the Act's 
effective date, that plaintiff would be entitled to collect 100% 
of his judgment from any of the joint tort-feasors even though 
the judgment is entered and collection is made after the Act's 
effective date. That situation creates a problem, however, 
because of the Act's provision eliminating the right to contri-
bution. The Liability Reform Act abolishes the right to contri-
bution of any joint tort-feasor who had not, before the effective 
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date of the Act, paid more than his pro rata share of liabil-
ity. The result is that a joint tort-feasor might be obligated 
to pay 100% of the judgment and yet be left without the ability 
to collect contribution from the other joint tort-feasors. The 
only way to avoid that unjust result under plaintiff's argument 
is for this Court to ignore the law regarding when the right to 
contribution vests and to rule that contribution is still avail-
able in all cases where the underlying cause of action arose 
before the Actfs effective date. 
By contrast, the argument advanced by defendant avoids 
any conflict between the Act's provision eliminating joint and 
several liability and that abolishing contribution. Under defen-
dant's argument, every judgment entered after the effective date 
of the Act could be enforced against any joint tort-feasor only 
to the extent of that joint tort-feasor's percentage of fault. 
Accordingly, as to any judgment entered after the effective date 
of the Act, the right to contribution would be unnecessary. The 
* Since the right of action for contribution does not accrue until 
one of several joint tort-feasors has paid more than his pro rata 
share of liability, Unigard Insurance Company v. City of 
LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344 (Utah 1984), the provision of the Liabil-
ity Reform Act abolishing contribution would eliminate the right 
to contribution of any joint tort-feasor who had not before the 
effective date of the Act paid more than his pro rata share of 
liability. 
-10-
Act's abolition of the right to contribution would be entirely 
consistent with the elimination of joint and several liability in 
all cases where judgment was not entered before the Act's effec-
tive date. 
In the present case, judgment was entered after the 
effective date of the Liability Reform Act which abolished the 
doctrine of joint and several liability. Accordingly, at the 
time the Act went into effect, plaintiff had no vested right in 
the doctrine of joint and several liability. Plaintiff was not, 
therefore, entitled to collect 100% of her judgment from defen-
dant. This case must be reversed and remanded with instructions 
to the trial court to order plaintiff to refund to defendant 75% 
of the amount plaintiff recovered, plus interest. 
III. 
IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO LOOK 
TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO 
RESOLVE THIS APPEAL 
In part B under Point I of her brief, plaintiff argues 
that the Legislature intended the Liability Reform Act's provi-
sion relating to the abolition of joint and several liability to 
apply only to causes of action arising after the Act's effective 
date. Plaintiff quotes statements made by two State Senators and 
the Act's principal draftsman in support of that proposition. 
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These statements, however, cannot be considered as definitive 
statements of legislative intent. They are merely individual 
statements of opinion and do not reflect any general intent of 
the legislature. If the legislature had truly wanted to manifest 
its intent, it could have done so as it has done on numerous 
occasions, by expressly so providing in the legislation. See, 
e.g. , U.C.A., § 78-16-1. 
In any event, the intent expressed by those statements 
is contrary to the established rules of law for determining the 
effect of the Act as explained in Point II above. Consequently, 
this Court need not give any weight to the statements to which 
plaintiff refers since they are contrary to the law regarding the 
vesting of the right to collect pursuant to joint and several 
liability. Legislative intent should not be substituted for 
established rules of interpretation. 
IV. 
THE ACTIONS OF JOHN DOE 
CONSTITUTE AN INTENTIONAL 
TORT FOR WHICH INSTRUCTION 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN 
In her responsive brief, the plaintiff asserts that 
defendant was not entitled to a duty of care instruction on 
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intentional torts because the conduct did not amount to an inten-
tional tort. 
An examination of the recordf at Trans., pp. 67-68 and 
112, shows that the defendant raised the issue of the need for 
instructions on an intentional tort. 
Plaintiff attempts to rely upon Matheson v. Pearson, 
619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980), to establish that the activity describ-
ed here was not an intentional tort. The case is distinguished 
from this one on two principal bases. The first basis is that 
Matheson was concerned with whether facts existed to defeat 
summary judgment. This Court held only that the facts alleged 
could be found to constitute negligence rather than an intention-
al tort. There was no finding that the activity of the defendant 
in Matheson was merely negligent as a matter of law. Consequent-
ly, Matheson is of little use in resolving this appeal. 
The second basis for distinguishing Matheson is that it 
reported the testimony of the tort-feasor as stating he did not 
intend to do any harm. The testimony in this case is that John 
Doe deliberately knocked down another patron seconds before 
knocking down the plaintiff and shouted something to the effect 
that: "I got another one". T. , p. 5. This statement clearly 
implies an intentional act intended to result in some harm. 
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Defendant attempted to have the jury consider the 
standard of care for an intentional tort by offering Instruction 
27 which was prefaced, "Should you determine that the plaintiff 
was deliberately knocked down. . • ." This introductory phrase 
to the instruction proposed to the jury that they could consider 
whether the action was intentional and gave them a standard of 
care to apply should they so find. The failure to give the jury 
clear guidelines to apply to the evidence left them without 
direction which was reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant respectfully requests the Court to re-
verse the judgment entered by the District Court for failure to 
properly instruct the jury and/or to declare the Liability Reform 
Act applicable to this case. 
DATED this 10th day of February, 1987. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
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